

# **Confronting Global Warming: Policies for the Reduction of Gasoline Consumption**

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
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
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# U.S. Carbon Dioxide by Sector (2005)


(Data Source: Energy Information Administration)



# Outline


- Gasoline, miles driven, fuel efficiency
  - Justifications for regulation
  - A few policy options
    - Gasoline tax
    - Carbon tax or tradable carbon permits
    - Fuel economy standards
  - New research directions
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- A series of light gray, wavy, horizontal lines that sweep across the bottom right portion of the slide, adding a decorative element to the layout.

# Gasoline Prices



Source: Energy Information Administration, *Short Term Energy Outlook*, January 2007


# Components of the price of gasoline



Source: Energy Information Administration

# Gasoline consumption


Gasoline and Gasohol Consumption 1990-2004  
(Source: FWHA Highway Statistics 2005)



# Vehicle miles traveled: 1990-2005


(Source: FWHA *Highway Statistics*)

**Vehicle Miles Traveled  
(per capita)**



# Vehicle miles traveled: 2006-2008

(Source: FWHHA *Traffic Volume Trends*)






# Changes in the vehicle market

(Data Sources: *Ward's Automotive Yearbook*, *Transportation Energy Data Book*)


## Share of Total Vehicle Sales




# Falling fuel economy

(Source: *Transportation Energy Data Book*)

Fleet Fuel Economy




# Justifications for regulation

- Per mile externalities
    - Congestion
    - Accidents
    - Local Pollution
  - Per gallon externalities
    - Global warming
    - Oil dependence
  - Interaction with labor market
  - Possible failures in market for fuel economy
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- A series of three overlapping, wavy, light gray lines that curve from the bottom left towards the right side of the slide, creating a sense of motion or a stylized landscape.


# External costs of vehicle use

Source: Parry et al. (*JEL* 2007))



# Per mile externalities


(Source: Parry et al. (*JEL* 2007))



# Interactions with labor market

(Source: West and Williams (*JPubE* 2007))

- Taxes on labor are inefficient because they reduce work
- If a gasoline tax:
  - Reduces work, labor markets become even less efficient
  - Increases work, labor markets become more efficient
- Gasoline and leisure are relative complements—a gasoline tax increases work
- Optimal gas tax even higher than external costs



# Are there failures in the market for fuel economy?

Do consumers undervalue future fuel costs?

- Greene (1997): small savings, too much information, boundedly rational consumers → undervaluation
- Kleit (*Econ. Inquir.* 2004) speaking of MPG:  
“it is difficult to think of an automobile attribute that is better communicated to consumers” (p. 281)
- Dreyfus and Viscusi (*J. Law Econ.* 1995):  
“consumers do have a long-term perspective with respect to safety and fuel efficiency...” (p. 103)

# Are there failures in the market for fuel economy?

- Surprisingly little work has been done to determine the effect of CAFE on producers' fuel efficiency decisions
  - Greene (1997) “magic of standards”
  - Portney et al. (*JEP* 2003) “manufacturers could undersupply vehicle attributes”—strategic behavior



# Policy options

Policies that reduce  
gasoline consumption  
*and* miles driven:

- Gas tax
- Carbon tax
- Pay-as-you drive insurance premiums

Policies that reduce  
gasoline consumption  
but *increase* miles driven:

- Fuel economy standards
- Gas guzzler tax
- Feebates

# CAFE versus the gas tax

- “Rebound effect” offsets 10 percent of initial fuel reduction from tighter CAFE standards (Small and Van Dender 2006)
- Like gasoline, miles driven are complements to leisure (West and Williams (AER 2005))

# Distributional Effects

- Gasoline tax is regressive, but:
  - Behavioral effects make tax significantly less regressive (West (*JPubE* (2004), West and Williams (*JEEM* (2005)))
  - Simple revenue rebate scheme can entirely offset regressivity (West and Williams (*JEEM* (2005)))
- CAFE standards
  - Likely to be progressive on consumer side
  - Effect on workers?

# CAFE versus gas tax

- CAFE standard has major downside
- Recent changes in CAFE good move
- Potential for failures in market for fuel economy
- Need policies that reduce miles driven
- Gasoline tax increase administratively simple

# Carbon tax or tradable permits

- Carbon tax or cap-and-trade alone do not internalize all externalities from driving
- Carbon tax or cap-and-trade plus congestion pricing attractive
  - Regional variation in external costs of driving means gas tax should also vary
  - Carbon tax everywhere, congestion pricing only where congestion is present

# New research directions

- The effect of gasoline price on fuel economy
  - West (working paper 2007)
    - Effect of gas price on probability of buying SUV, truck, van, car
    - Using only contemporaneous price significantly underestimates effect of gas price on vehicle choice
  - Sallee and West (work in progress)
    - Effect of gasoline prices on new vehicles' prices
    - Threshold and duration effects, asymmetries
    - Dealer-level new vehicle transactions, weekly gas prices by city

# New research directions

- Ethanol demand: Anderson (2007)

<http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sorenta/>

- Data from Minnesota
- Consumers substitute very easy between fuels
- Simulates adoption of national ethanol standard:
  - Average consumer is willing to pay a small premium for ethanol
  - This reduces cost of a moderate ethanol content standard
  - Policy remains quite expensive: Implied cost per gallon of gasoline saved or ton of carbon emissions avoided far in excess of marginal external damages.